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I. INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the relatively short history of
Internal Revenue Code § 280A and to discuss the cases leading up to the United
States Supreme Court decision of Commissioner v. Soliman.1 The scope of the
discussion will be limited to I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A), which provides for a home
office deduction if the dwelling unit is exclusively used on a regular basis and
is the principal place of business for any trade or business.
2
As will be discussed below, the Supreme Court has developed various
standards to determine whether a home office deduction will be allowed. The
traditional test is an objective "focal point test." The modem test, however,
under Soliman is a subjective test in which a court will consider two factors to
determine whether the taxpayer's home is his principal place of business. The
first factor is to determine the relative importance of the activities performed
at each of the locations (if more than one). The second factor is to consider the
amount of time spent at each place.
The Soliman case has significantly altered the course of the home office
deduction. The Supreme Court has narrowed the window of this deduction in
order to obtain fixed standards to allow or disallow a deduction.
3 This
comment will argue that the application of this decision will result in an
unequal impact among taxpayers solely for the purpose of judicial efficiency.
1113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
2See I.R.C. § 280A(f)(1)(A) (West 1993). The term "dwelling unit" includes a house,
apartment, condominium, mobile home, boat or similar property.
3 Michael M. Meggard & Susan L. Meggard, Supreme Court Narrows Home Office
Deductions in Soliman, 78 J. TAX'N 132 (Mar. 1993).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
In addition, the decision and its impact on the availability of the home office
deduction will be discussed in detail.
II. WHY HAVE A HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION?
A home office deduction allows an ordinary business person to deduct
expenses that are directly related to his business.4 A tax-paying business
person may deduct his pro rata share of the utilities, repairs, insurance, and
office fixtures. 5 The following hypothetical will help demonstrate the
operation of the deduction:
A school teacher operates a small antique business out of her home and
desires to take a home office deduction for her back porch which she
converted into a show room for the merchandise. Assume that 25% of
the general expenses for the dwelling unit are attributable to the home
office. The taxpayer's gross income and expenses for her business
would break down as follows:
Gross Income ................................ $40,000
Home Office Expenses Total Allocable to Office
(25% of dwelling
unit expenses)
Interest and Property Taxes 8,000 2,000
Insurance, Utilities, Maintenance 2,000 500
Depreciation 6,000 1,500
Total Home Office Expenses ............. $4,0006
Without the enactment of I.R.C. § 280A, the aforementioned expenses would
be non-deductible as merely constituting personal expenses. 7 The deductions
would only be allowed if they could qualify as ordinary and necessary business
expenses.8 Section 280A, nevertheless, allows for the home office deduction.
I.R.C. §§ 162(a) and 280A are similar in that their ultimate purpose is to allow
deductions only for those expenses which are business oriented and not
personal.
III. THE HISTORY AND ENACIMENT OF I.R.C. § 280A
Before Congress created the home office deduction through its enactment of
I.R.C. § 280A, a deduction was only allowed for business purposes and
41.R.C. § 280A (West 1993).
5 See Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(3) (1983).
61992 U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE 255-58 (C.C.H. 1991) (facts and figures modified).
71.R.C. § 262(a) (West 1993).
8 I.R.C. § 162(a) & 167(a) (West 1993).
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depreciation. 9 The following cases exemplify the different procedures used by
the courts prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 280A in 1976. Ultimately, these
different tests have led to confusion concerning when a deduction would be
allowed.
For example, in Davis v. Commissioner, the Tax Court disallowed a professor's
deduction for a home study because the deductions were not for ordinary and
necessary business expenses. 10 The professor built and furnished an office over
his garage to use as his study.11 He used the study to grade papers and to
prepare for his lectures. 12 The majority used a strict interpretation of the Code
and refused to allow the deduction because it was not an ordinary and
necessary business expense. The court reasoned that the expenses were more
personal than business.13 A strong dissent argued that the better standard to
determine the availability of the deduction is the "appropriate and helpful"
test.14 This test, proposed by the dissenters, triggered the conflicting standards
within the Tax Court and federal courts.15
The decision of Bodzin v. Commissioner exemplifies the inconsistencies
between the Tax Court and the Courts of Appeals. 16 Ironically, Mr. Bodzin was
an attorney-advisor in the office of the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue
Service. 17 Bodzin lived in an apartment in which he used an 8x12 foot room
as his study to keep up on current tax issues and matters related to his work.18
Bodzin alleged that a mere $100 of his $2,100 for rent during the tax year of 1967
was attributable to his study and deducted it as a business expense. The
Commissioner denied the deduction and the Tax Court reversed. The court
held that the deduction qualified as an "appropriate and helpful" business
expense.19 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and concluded that
91d. A helpful summary of the cases before the enactment of § 280A is found in Karen
0. Green,.Recent Cases and Rulings for the Income Taxation of Individuals, 4 REV. OF TAX'N
FOR INDIVIDUALS 366 (1980).
1038 T.C. 175 (1962).
1lid. at 179.
121d.
13Id.
141d. at 180-88 (Raum, J., dissenting).
15See Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming a Tax Court which
followed the Davis dissenters and holding that an ABC television advertising salesman
was entitled to a business deduction for his home office because itwas both "appropriate
and helpful").
1660 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
171d. at 825.
18Id.
191d.
1993]
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Bodzin's apartment was simply not used as his place of business.20 The
appellate court's rationale for reversing the Tax Court was that he purely by
choice elected to do some of his work at home, just as some lawyers and judges
elect to do.21 The court in essence avoided adopting one particular test.
The foregoing cases exemplify the different standards that courts have used
when analyzing a potential deduction for a home office or study. The standards
range from "ordinary and necessary" to "appropriate and helpful" to a complete
avoidance of the conflict.22 The conflicting standards have never provided
taxpayers with a relatively clear cut method to determine whether their offices
qualified for a deduction. This problem led to the possibility of taxpayer abuse.
In order to rectify the potential for taxpayer abuse under the "appropriate
and helpful" standard Congress enacted I.R.C. § 280A as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976.23 Specifically, the section begins with a general rule of exclusion
and provides:
(a) General rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the
case of a taxpayer who is an individual or an S corporation, no
deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed
with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer
during the taxable year as a residence.
24
After the general rule of exclusion the Code adopts three exceptions. I.R.C.
§ 280A(c)(1) provides the following exceptions:
Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is
allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on
a regular basis-
(A) the principal place of business for any trade or business of
the taxpayer.
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or
customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal
course of his trade or business, or
20509 F.2d 679, 681 (4th Cir. 1971).
2 1 d. The Court also concluded that Mr. Bodzin's employer provided access to his
office during the evenings and on the weekends. Id.
22 See Davis v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 175 (1962); Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d
998 (2d Cir. 1970); Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
23 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 601, 90 Stat. 1520, 1569-72 (1977).
241.R.C. § 280A(a). Treasury Regulation 1.280A-l(a) provides an additional
requirement as follows:
If a deduction is claimed for an item attributable to a dwelling unit
used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence, the tax
payer must first establish that it is otherwise allowable as a deduction
under chapter 1 of the Code before the provisions of section 280A
become applicable.
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(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the
dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or
business.
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if
the exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the
convenience of the employer.
25
In addition, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to prove that his activities
fit within one of the exceptions. 26 Additionally, this section provides that if the
taxpayer is an employee, the deductions will only be allowed if the dwelling
is used for the convenience of the employer.27
Despite Congress' attempt to clarify the availability of a home office
deduction, I.R.C. § 280A has been subject to varying interpretations. 28 In
essence, the Tax Court and Courts of Appeals have simply returned to the
muddy waters of pre-§ 280A. In the seventeen years since the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, the courts have failed to follow a clear cut rule for determining the
availability of the home office deduction. The Soliman decision represents the
United States Supreme Court's attempt to solve the home office deduction
dilemma.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE VARIOUS TESTS USED BY THE COURTS TO DETERMINE THE
AVAILABILITY OF A DEDUCTION UNDER I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A)
There are two elements which must be satisfied in order for a court to allow
a deduction under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A). First, the portion of the dwelling unit
used by the taxpayer must be the principal place of business exclusively used
as an office.29 Second, the home office must be used for a trade or business.3 0
The second element will be discussed first because it provides far less
interpretive problems for the courts than the first element.
25I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (West 1993).
26 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). I.R.C. § 280A imposes heavy burden on
taxpayers to prove that their home office expenses meet the stringent standards of
deductibility. See Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 77 (7th Cir. 1986).
27 See I.R.C. § 280A(c) (West 1993). While convenience of the employer is not defined
in the Tax Code or its Regulations, there must at least be some showing that the offer is
for the convenience of the employer. In Drucker, the Court of Appeals adopted the Tax
Court's decision which concluded that the home office deduction would be denied
because the taxpayer made "no showing that the office was used for the convenience of
the employer." Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1983).
28The purpose of the Act was to provide more definitive rules relating to deductions
attributable to the business use of homes. See Harris v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH)
1130 (1983) (quoting S. REP. No. 1236).
29 1.R.C. § 280A(c)(1(A) (West 1993).
301d.
1993]
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The trade or business element of I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) is not defined in the
Code or the Treasury Regulations.3 1 However the courts will undertake an
analysis of several factors in order to reach a conclusion regarding the alleged
business activity. For example, in Moller v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit analyzed several factors and ultimately denied a home
office deduction.3 2 The taxpayers, Mr. and Mrs. Moller, devoted their full-time
work to their investment activities which included the management of four
portfolios of stocks and bonds.33 Each worked approximately forty hours a
week and kept regular office hours.34 The taxpayers filed a joint income tax
return and claimed deductions attributable to maintaining the taxpayer's two
offices in the amount of approximately $7,500 for the tax years of 1976 and
1977.35 The IRS disallowed the deductions, but the Claims Court held that they
were engaged in a trade or business and entitled to a deduction under I.R.C.
§ 280A. 36
The Court of Appeals reversed and determined that the Mollers were
investors, not traders, and that their activities did not amount to a trade or
business.37 The court did, however, recognize that the Mollers' investment
activities were continuous, regular and extensive.38 Ironically, the court held
that this was insufficient in light of the nature of their investments. 39 The court
focused on the fact that their income was derived from the long term holding
of securities and not short term trading.40 In essence, the court simply reasoned
that the home office deduction was only for the production of income and not
for a trade or business.
3 1Section 162(a) does provide some guidance if the expenses are ordinary and
necessary. Under this section, a deduction will be allowed for all expenses that are
ordinarily and necessarily paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1993). The expenditures must directly relate to
the trade or business and include the following: management expenses, commissions,
labor, supplies, incidental repairs, operating expenses of an automobile used in the trade
or business, travelling expenses, advertising, and insurance premiums. See Treas. Reg.
1.162-1(a)(1988). This list is by no means exhaustive of the available deductible
expenses. I.R.C. § 263(a) limits section 162(a) by not allowing a deduction for capital
expenditures for new buildings, permanent improvements or betterments made to
increase the value of property. I.R.C. § 263(a) (West 1993).
32721 F.2d 810,815 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
331d. at 811.
341d.
351d. at 812.
361d.
37 Moller v. Commissioner, 721 F.2d 810, 815 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
381d.
391d.
401d.
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The court's analysis was improper. The court should have avoided its
attempt at distinguishing between traders and investors by declaring that the
expenses were personal in nature. Section 262(a) of the Code prohibits
deductions that are for "personal, living or family expenses." The Mollers'
expenses should have been denied under this theory because the investment
portfolios were their personal ones. They did not manage or solicit business
from other individuals. It is this type of interpretive problems which has led
the courts to develop inefficient methods of determining deductibility.
The courts, nevertheless, still participate in intricate line drawing regarding
the trade or business element. In Gaiewski v. Commissioner,4 1 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals disallowed a home office deduction for a full-time gambler
because he was not engaged in a trade or business. 42 The court looked to three
considerations: 1) whether the taxpayer is regularly and actively involved in
the activity; 2) whether he holds himself out to others as engaged in the selling
of goods and services; and 3) an analysis of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the purported trade or business.43 The court chose to focus on
the second consideration because it was administratively fair and workable to
taxpayers.44 The court reasoned that the taxpayer only gambled for his own
account and did not hold himself out as an operator of a bookmaking service.45
He was, therefore, not engaged in a trade or business according to the Court.
Despite the Gaiewski court's attempt to create an administratively workable
standard, the courts still maintain a case-by-case analysis as to what constitutes
a trade or business. Both Gaiewski and Moller indicate that in the absence of
workable standards, the courts must engage in line drawing that only serves
to confuse taxpayers and tax-planners. This element has, however, produced
far less confusion and inefficiency than the second element under I.R.C.
§ 280(c)(1)(A), namely, whether the portion of the dwelling unit used by the
taxpayer is used exclusively as the principle place of business.
Once a court determines that taxpayers's activities are a trade or business, it
will then determine whether the home office is the principal place of business.46
It is this element which has produced the most litigation since the enactment
of I.R.C. § 280A. The effects of this litigation culminated in the Soliman decision,
41723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983).
4 2 [d.
43 1d. at 1065-66.
44 Id. at 1067.
45Id.
46 1.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) also requires an exclusivity element. Thus, an investigation may
reveal that a purported office doubles as a den or guest room. This scenario would deny
the deduction. See Hamacher v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 348 (1990)(concluding that a
taxpayer may conduct more than one business activity from a home office under I.R.C.
§ 280A(c)(1)). But see Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428 (1982)(concluding that a
taxpayer can only have one principal place of business for each business in which he is
engaged).
1993]
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wherein the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the home office deduction by
narrowing its availability through the application of a new subjective test.
The Treasury Regulations recommend a facts-and-circumstances analysis
to determine the principal place of business when the taxpayer conducts his
trade or business at more than one location.47 Under the regulation, a court
would consider several factors, including the total income attributable to each
location and the facilities at each location. The facts-and-circumstances test
was never formally adopted by the courts prior to Soliman, which involves an
analysis of similar factors.
The predominant test the courts have elected to use to locate the principal
place of business since the enactment of the home office deduction is the focal
point test. Under the focal point test, a court will look to the location of each of
the taxpayer's business activities.48 A court will ultimately base its decision on
where the goods and services are exchanged. The focal point test is an objective
test because it involves an analysis of factors that are not subject to change
based solely on a court's discretion.
In Pomarantz v. Commissioner49 the Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's
finding of a tax deficiency because the taxpayer's home office did not qualify
as the principal place of business under the tax code.50 On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the Tax Court judgment was affirmed. 51 The taxpayer in Pomarantz
was a physician specializing in emergency care medicine. 52 He maintained a
home office to keep his medical records and journals. In his office, he spent up
to 250 hours per year reading medical journals and following up on patient
care.53
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's use of the focal point test.54
However, the appellate court concluded that under the focal point test the
hospital, rather than the home, was the taxpayer's principal place of business. 55
47 Treas. Reg. 1.280A-2(3) (1983).
48 See Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981); and Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
105 (1980)(determining that Congress intended the focal point to be the location of the
taxpayer's activities).
49867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988).
50Id.
51 d. at 497.
521d. at 495.
53 d. Because the taxpayer in Poniarantz did not treat patients in his home, he avoided
the possibility of a deduction under to I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B), which allows for
deductions where a dwelling unit is a place of business used by patients and clients.
54Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495,497 (9th Cir. 1988). The court also noted
that the taxpayer's deduction would fail under a test which analyzed the location of
where the dominant portion of the work was accomplished.
55 d. Pornarantz is strikingly similar to Solinian both factually, and as an alternative
test to the focal point test. Both cases resulted in a denial of the deduction.
[Vol.41:789
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The Court determined that Dr. Pomerantz's principle place of business was the
hospital because he consistently spent more time on duty while at the hospital,
rather than at home.56
In Drucker v. Commissioner57 the Tax Court also used the focal point test to
deny the taxpayer musician a home office deduction. 58 In Drucker, the taxpayer
musician was a member of the Metropolitan Opera Orchestra in New York City
and used a room in his five room apartment as his studio.59 The musician used
the home studio approximately thirty hours per week for practice.60 The court
used the focal point test and broke the activities down into three categories:
practice, rehearsal and performance.61 The court determined that the focal
point of his activities was at Lincoln Center because his position as a member
of the orchestra required him to rehearse and perform at Lincoln Center.62 The
court also determined that Lincoln Center was the location where the goods
and services were exchanged. 63 The court did admit that the taxpayer's
practice was essential to maintain his technical expertise.64
Both the Pomarantz court and the Drucker court recognized that some
activities require organization and practice away from the focal point (principal
place of business) of their activities.65 These cases exemplify the Tax Court's
unwillingness to succumb to a case-by-case subjective test.66 In fact, Congress
attempted to reject this analysis and provide clear objective guidelines to
determine whether a home office deduction would be allowed.67
The objective focal point test was not without criticism. In Drucker, Judge
Wilbur's dissent demonstrated, through the use of examples, that the objective
56 The Court emphasized that the very essence of the medical profession is based on
treatment at the hospital and not studying or writing at home.
5779 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
58Id.
591d. at 605-06.
60Id.
61Id.
62 Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 605-06 (1982).
63Id.
64Id.
65 Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988); 79 T.C. 605 (1982).
66The Tax Court's decision in Drucker was reversed on appeal and the Court favored
an alternative test which looked to the time and importance of the activities at the home.
715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983). In Weisman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984), the
Court of Appeals again rejected the focal point test in favor of placing the emphasis
where the dominant portion of his work is accomplished.
67H. R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897,
3054. See also Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1983).
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focal point test is deficient.68 Judge Wilbur argued that the principal place of
business of a lecturer is not the place of delivery but rather the location at which
he creates his speeches. 6 9 Judge Wilbur also added that the principal place of
business of an artist is neither the gallery nor the museum where his paintings
are sold or exhibited, but rather, it is where he uses his "extraordinary skill
practicing, experimenting, revising, and perfecting his craft.' 70
A further illustration of the problems of the focal point tests rests with the
ubiquitous travelling salesman. A travelling salesman conducts most of his
business on the road. It is on the road where his goods and service are
exchanged. Under the focal point test, a court would undoubtedly determine
that his principal place of business is on the road. The injustice exhibited here
is that a salesman must have some type of home office in order to schedule
appointments, solicit business, take care of bills and study new or competitive
products. His home office is certainly relatively important to his business, yet
a court will deny his deduction. Congress attempted to prevent taxpayer abuse
by providing the guidelines for a home office deduction.71 The salesman in
this example is not abusing the potential deduction. As a travelling salesman,
he would most likely prefer to be at home with his family rather than in an
office away from home.
The tests that the courts have developed for both elements of the home office
deduction have produced unjust results for many taxpayers. With the Solinan
decision, the United States Supreme Court has effectively eliminated the
availability of a home office deduction at the expense of the non-abusing
taxpayers who maintain legitimate home offices.72
V. SOLIMAN: THE DECISION, IMPACT AND CRITICISM
The United States Supreme Court has narrowed the availability of the home
office deduction by adopting a subjective test.73 The Tax Court and the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, by using a facts-and-circumstances test, had left a
window of opportunity open for those taxpayers who use a home office. The
Solinan decision quickly shut this window without a justifiable rationale. 74
The taxpayer in Solinan was a self-employed anesthesiologist who worked
thirty to thirty-five hours per week, treating patients in three hospitals in the
6 8Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 610 (1982), rev'd 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983)(Wilbur, J., dissenting).
691d.
70 Id.
7 11.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (West 1993).
72 Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
73 Id.
74 See RobertT. Kelly, Jr., Honie Office Deductions Restricted By Supreme Court, 50 TAX'N
FORACCT. 196 (1993); Michael M. Meggard & Susan L. Meggard, Suprene Court Narrows
Home Office Deductions in Soliman, 78 J. TAX'N 132 (1993).
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Maryland and Virginia area.75 None of the three hospitals provided him with
an office. 76 The taxpayer lived in a three bedroom condominium and used a
spare bedroom exclusively as an office. 77 The taxpayer did not meet with the
patients in his office; but he did spend two to three hours a day conducting the
following activities:
1. Contacting patients, surgeons and hospitals;
2. maintaining billing records and patient logs;
3. preparing for treatments and presentations;
4. satisfying continuing medical education requirements; and
5. reading medical journals and books. 78
The taxpayer claimed a deduction for the portion of the fees, utilities and
depreciation attributable to his home office.79 The Commissioner denied the
deductions because the office was not his principal place of business. 80 The
taxpayer filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking a review of the tax
deficiency.81 The Tax Court surprisingly abandoned the focal point test after
citing its criticisms.82 The Tax Court determined that the focal test point should
be abandoned because its effect was to merge I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) with
§ 280A(c)(1)(B), when the two sub-sections were intended to be applied
separately.83 The Tax Court in its place created the "facts-and-circumstances"
test.
84
7 5Solinan, 113 S. Ct. at 704.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. In Solimnan, the taxpayer did not fall under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B) or (C) because
he did not treat patients in the same bedroom, and the office did not involve a separate
structure.
791d.
80Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 704 (1993).
81id.
82 Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that the focal point test
is not fair to taxpayers because it places undue emphasis upon the location of where the
goods and services are provided and not where the work is predominantly performed);
Weisman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984) (criticizing the focal point test
because it shifts attention to the place where the taxpaer's work is most visible, rather
than where the dominant portion of this work is accomplished); Drucker v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983) (criticizing the
application of the focal point test beca use "[bloth in time and importance, home practice
was the 'focal point' of the appellant musician's employment related activities").
83 Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20 (1990), affd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
84 Solinan, 935 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir. 1991).
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The Court of Appeals, in its review of the Tax Court's decision, adopted the
following factors which the Tax Court stated weighed heavily in favor of a
finding that the home office was the taxpayer's principal place of business:
1. The office in the home is essential to the taxpayer's business;
2. he spends a substantial amount of time there; and
3. there is no other location available for the performance of the
office functions of his business.
8 5
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's use of this new
facts-and-circumstance test to hold that the doctor's principal place of
business was his residence office, and accordingly, that he was entitled to a
home office deduction.86 The Supreme Court rejected the new
facts-and-circumstances test, reversing the Court of Appeals, and denying the
deduction.87 In so doing, the Court adopted yet another test to determine the
taxpayer's principal place of business.
The Court adopted a subjective test and stated that "we cannot develop an
objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case."88 Under the new
subjective test, the Court requires that two primary factors must be considered
to determine the principal place of business. First a court must consider the
relative importance of the activities performed at each business location. 89
Second a court must determine the amount of time spent at each place
conducting business.9 0
In determining the relative importance of the activities performed at each
place, the Supreme Court rejected the focal point test as being too conclusive
because it could be misleading.9 1 Yet, the Court stated that great weight must
be given to this factor.92 In analyzing the time factor at each location, the
Supreme Court stated that this element is of particular importance when the
relative importance of the business location fails to give a definitive answer.93
The Court's rationale behind denying the deduction in Solinan is that it
determined that the most significant event was the actual treatment of the
patients.94 The Supreme Court accordingly held that the home office activities
85 Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 704.
86 Soliman, 935 F.2d at 55.
87113 S. Ct. at 706-08.
88 d. at 706.
89 Id.
90Id.
91Id.
92 Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 706 (1993).
9 3 d. at 707.
94 d. at 708.
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must be regarded as far less important.95 Considering the time element, the
Court simply determined that 10-15 hours per week in the home office, as
compared to the 30-35 hours per week at the three hospitals, was not sufficient
to qualify the taxpayer for the home office deduction. 96
The Solimnan Court, by its implementation of the subjective test, has virtually
extinguished the effectiveness of I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A). 97 Only a very small
number of the taxpayers who use a home office will be allowed a deduction.
Furthermore, the Solirnan decision has been subject to great criticism because
it has not clarified the muddy waters of the home office deduction.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Solirnan, began the criticism.98 Justice Stevens
emphasized that the purpose of the I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) standard is to
prevent abuse and not to deny valid deductions. 99 Justice Stevens favored the
proposed test by the Tax Court and Court of Appeals because it is virtually
incapable of abuse. 100 The key factor emphasized by Justice Stevens was that
the home office must be the only office available to the taxpayer.101
In addition to Justice Sevens' dissent, there are recent commentators who
criticize the Solinan decision.102 Specifically, one commentator provided a list
of individual taxpayers who would be affected most by the new standard. 103
Taxpayers greatly affected include individuals in the health care profession. 104
Anesthesiologists and emergency room physicians rarely see patients in their
own home, yet they need a home office for the same purposes as the
taxpayer-doctor in Solirnan.105 Individuals in the construction trade are also
affected because they too meet with clients at the job site and perform their
trade and skills away from home.106 The commentator also emphasized that
95Yd.
9 6 1d. One of the most startling factors of the Solinian opinion is that it was 8 to 1
decision. In the majority and concurring with the majority were Justices Kennedy,
White, O'Connor, Blackmun, Souter, Thomas, Scalia and Chief Justice Renquist. The
lone dissenter was Justice Stevens, who emphasized that the Court's decision will again
breed uncertainty in the law.
9 7Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 712 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9 8 Id.
9 9 1d.
1 001d. at 715.
101/d.
102See Meggard, supra note 3.
1 0 3 See Robert T. Kelly Jr. Home Office Deductions Restricted by Supreme Court, 50 TAX'N
FOR ACCT. 196 (1993).
1041d.
105M.
1061d.
19931
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professors, artists and salesmen will suffer because they perform the majority
of their services away from home.107
Because this criticism of the Solinan rule is well-taken, the better rule to
follow regarding the principal place of business of a taxpayer is the rule set
forth in the Court of Appeals opinion in the Soliman case.108 The key element
in the Court of Appeals test, as noted by Justice Stevens, is the requirement that
no other office be available to the taxpayer.1 09 This element benefits those
taxpayers who need an office in their home to conduct necessary office
functions connected with their trade or business. This requirement also
prevents taxpayer abuse because there simply cannot be another office
available to the taxpayer. For example, the lawyer who maintains a home office
in addition to his regular office will be denied the deduction; and, he will be
unable to reap the benefits of deducting the expenses related to his home office.
Therefore, the facts-and-circumstances test is the better method for
determining the home office deduction.
The following hypothetical fact patterns demonstrate the injustices of the
new Solinan decision. For example, consider the professional house painter
who maintains a home office. His in-office activities would consist of the
following:
1. Billing customers and issuing statements;
2. scheduling painting crews;
3. scheduling painting times;
4. contacting and contracting with suppliers by phone;
5. contacting customers; and
6. writing estimates.
The out-of-office activities would consist of:
1. On site estimates;
2. scraping;
3. filling;
4. priming; and
5. painting.
Under Soliman, a court would first consider whether the home office was
exclusively used for his trade or business. For purposes of this hypothetical, it
is assumed that the painter would fulfill this requirement. The court would
next consider the relative importance of each of the locations of the business
activities. Undoubtedly, a court following the Soliman rule would find that the
actual painting activities constitute the principal place of business, just as the
location of the administration of anesthetics constitutes the principal place of
business of the physician in Soliman. 110 In addition, the time factor would
107See supra notes 3, at 103.
108Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991).
109Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 712 (1993) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
110Solitnan, 113 S. Ct. at 708. The actual treatment was the most siginificant event in
the professional transaction.
[Vol.41:789
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/7
HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION AFTER SOLIMAN
weigh toward the out-of-office activities, because the actual preparation and
painting take longer than scheduling and billing. Therefore, under the Soliman
rule, the taxpayer in this hypothetical would be denied the deduction.
Under the Court of Appeals facts-and-circumstances test, the painter would
be allowed a deduction for his home office expenses. First, a court would
determine that his office was essential to his painting business because without
it he could neither perform nor run his business. Second, a court would
determine that the amount of time spent there would be substantial enough to
satisfy the time element. The most important factor, if not the controlling factor,
of this test-no other location available to perform the functions of
business-would also be fulfilled because there is no other office available to
the professional painter. The painter would therefore receive the deduction he
is entitled to under the Code.111
Comparing the two tests reveals that each will provide the same end result
only if the taxpayer works exclusively out of his home. For example, if the
taxpayer claiming a home office deduction was an attorney working
exclusively out of his home, there would be no change in the end result. Under
Solinan, the attorney would receive the deduction because of the relative
importance of the activities performed in his office and the amount of time
spent in the office.112 Similarly, under the Court of Appeals test, the attorney
also would be allowed the deduction if he has no other office for his law
practice.113
The foregoing hypotheticals exemplify the administrative inconsistencies
that will result from the Solirnan decision. Under Solinan, an attorney or an
accountant would almost always receive the home office deduction, whereas
the painter or landscaper will not receive the deduction. Since the purpose
behind the tax code is to provide efficient, equal and fair rules and guidelines
for taxation, the better test to follow in order to determine the principal place
of business for the taxpayer is the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
facts-and-circumstances test. Specifically, the provision that requires no other
available office guarantees an efficient, fair and equal administration of the
home office deduction section. This provision will also silence the fear that the
Tax Court, federal courts and Congress have of the possibility for taxpayer
abuse.
111An analysis of a hypothetical involving an on-site custom cabinet maker or a
landscaper would result in the same conclusions reached in the painter examples.
112The in-office activities would consist of meeting with clients, conducting research,
writing briefs, motions, memoranda, and continuing legal education.
113An example involving an accountant or a real estate appraiser would also result
in the same conclusions reached in the attorney example. z
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VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT IS LEFT OF THE HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION?
Since the Soliman decision the Tax Court has had at least three opportunities
to modify or criticize the new home office test.114 The three opinions, which
are discussed below, indicate that the Tax Court is neither ready nor willing to
challenge the authority of the Supreme Court. It appears from these opinions
that the Tax Court will continue to accept the new test, despite its previous
formulation of the equitable facts-and-circumstances test.1 15
On April 29, 1993, just three months after Soliman, the Tax Court accepted
the Supreme Court's new subjective test to determine the availability of a home
office deduction. 116 The pertinent issue in Crawford was whether the taxpayer
was entitled to a home office deduction for the 1985 and 1986 tax years.117
During these tax years, the taxpayer worked as an independent contractor in
the medical field, providing emergency medical services for three to four local
hospitals in Dallas, Texas.118 In his home office, the taxpayer's activities
consisted of follow-up work for patients, drafting correspondence and
conducting other activities related to his medical practice. 119 The taxpayer
spent approximately three to four hours in his home office for every ten hours
spent at the hospitals.120 The taxpayer's office was the largest room in the
house and consisted of 20% of the total square footage. 121
The Tax Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's rejection of the use of the
availability of alternative office space as a factor in determining the principal
place of business.122 The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer's home office
was not his principal place of business, under the Supreme Court's subjective
test, because he spent much more time at the hospitals than he did at home. 123
114 Crawford v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2540 (1993); Steines v.
Commissioner, No. 91-3632, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS, 12535 (7th Cir. Apr. 20, 1993); and
Bowles v. Commissioner 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2733 (1993).
11 5See supra note 114.
116Crawford v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2540 (1993).
11 71d. at 2541.
1181d.
1191d. at 2542.
1201d.
12165 T.C.M. (CCH) 2540, 2542 (1993). The taxpayer's office was furnished with the
following items: private examination tables; storage cabinets for surgical tools and
medicines; storage for patients' records; and business records and a small waiting area
with chairs for the patients.
122 d. at 2544.
123 d. The Tax Court also addressed the "meeting and dealing with patients" exception
set forth in I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B), even though the taxpayer never raised the issue in his
brief. The court stated that incidental meetings were not enough to qualify for this
exception. Furthermore, the court found that the record failed to show the frequency
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The Tax Court simply failed to criticize the Supreme Court's rejection of the
more equitable rule that the Tax Court and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
formulated.124
In two subsequent cases, the Tax Court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
followed the Crawford lead and did not criticize the Soliman decision. In Steines
v. Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's
reduction of a home office deduction. 125 The taxpayer claimed a deduction
totalling 38.5% of his home and the Tax Court reduced the deduction to 7%.126
The deduction was reduced because the Tax Court determined at trial that the
taxpayer's first level living room area and "main" entry areas were not
exclusively used for business purposes.12 7 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
findings of the Tax Court, finding no error.128 More importantly the Court of
Appeals again acknowledged the new Soliman test without criticizing it,
parenthetically quoting Soliman as follows: "[the test] requires a comparative
analysis of the various business locations, including analysis of the relative
importance of functions performed at each location in light of the nature of the
business."129 The court simply failed to discuss Soliman any further.130
Finally, in Bowles v. Commissioner, the Tax Court again accepted Soliman
without criticism. 131 The taxpayer in Bowles was a studio photographer, who
worked for the Texas Youth Commission, teaching art to violent juveniles. 132
The taxpayer used his home office for drawing and preparing lesson plans and
developing his photographs in the bathroom. 133 He deducted 1/7 of his
expenses as constituting valid home office deductions, which were denied. 134
The court again followed Soliman and failed to criticize it.135The court
concluded that his in-office activities were ancillary to the services he
performed as a teacher with the Youth Commission. 136
and regularity of the visits by the patients to the taxpayer's home office. The deduction
was denied based on this reason. Id.
124See supra note 108.
125 No. 91-3632, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS, 12435 (7th Cir. Apr. 20, 1993).
126/d.
127/d. at *7.
128 /d.
1291d.
130See supra note 125.
13165 T.C.M. (CCH) 2733 (1993).
132Id.
133 1d.
134 1d.
13SId.
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These three cases indicate that the Tax Court and Court of Appeals will
neither challenge nor attempt to modify the Soliman rule in the near future.
However, once the inequities of the United States Supreme Court's new test
become apparent, then either the courts should modify the test or Congress
should enact new legislation which reflects the better result dictated by the
facts-and-circumstances test.
The Soliman decision still does not afford clear guidelines for determining
the availability of a home office deduction. The only thing that has been
accomplished is that deductions are denied for carpenters, landscapers,
construction workers, doctors, professors, musicians, artists and sales
professionals. Only a limited few are unharmed by the Soliman decision, such
as lawyers and accountants. The clearest rule to follow for efficiency and
fairness is the facts-and-circumstances test: The element requiring that no
other office be available is essential.
The impact of Solinan requires tax-planners to carefully consider the
ramifications of the decision. First of all Solitnan involved only I.R.C.
§ 280A(c)(1)(A). Home office deductions are still available if a taxpayer meets
or deals with clients in his home.137 Second, the taxpayer can use a separate
structure on his property as an office; but he may still have to satisfy the Soliman
requirements. 138 One tax journal reports that the best method of planning is
to keep accurate records and diaries of the time and activities spent with the
business and to arrange business activities so that the taxpayer meets with
clients in his home.139
In conclusion, the home office deduction is still available so long as there is
adequate planning. The future of Solinan is uncertain, especially in light of the
sound reasoning behind the facts-and-circumstances test. If the criticisms of
Soliman continue, the Tax Court may again revert to this better standard in order
to achieve efficiency, equality and most importantly, fairness. However, current
decisions indicate that there will be no substantial change in the test in the near
future.140 Hopefully, the courts and Congress will realize the futility of the
Soliman test and provide better guidance to the taxpayer. Time will tell.
ROBERT J. GERLACK
13665 T.C.M. (CCH) 2733, 2734 (1993).
13 71.R.C. § 280(A)(c)(1)(B) provides in part: "as a place of business which is used by
patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal
course of his trade or business."
138 I.R.C. § 280(A)(c)(1)(C) provides in part: "separate structure which is not attached
to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business."
139See Kelly, supra note 103.
140See Crawford v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2540 (1993); Steines v.
Commissioner, No. 91-3632,1993 U.S. App. LEXIS, 12535 (7th Cir. April 20, 1993); and
Bowles v. Commissioner 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2733 (1993).
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